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Dealing with the vulnerability of the Italian banking system 
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The recent crisis has brought heightened attention to non-
performing assets. At first it was mainly focused on financial assets, 
when the crisis was revolving around the pyramid of fictitious 
liquidity created over a substantially limited amount of US sub-prime 
mortgage debt. Afterwards, when the financial crisis was followed by 
the economic one, particularly affecting the weakest EU countries, the 
rapid increase of non-performing loans (NPLs) took centre stage. 
The accumulation and decumulation of the stock of NPLs depends 
on the relative dynamics of two flows: the velocity with which they are 
created, net of recoveries, and the velocity of their disposal. The first 
flow depends on factors that are partly exogenous to the banking 
system, such as economic growth, and partly endogenous, such as the 
management of risks. The second flow depends on the magnitude of 
the losses associated to the management of the NPLs, for which legal, 
institutional, and tax issues play a significant role, compared to the 
resources available to banks, linked to their profitability. 
The rapid increase of NPLs, due to the long spell of low growth 
and to a structurally modest and decreasing bank profitability, is an 
EU-wide phenomenon that particularly affects Italy compared to the 
other major countries of the euro area. The Italian banking system 
thus faces the problem of eliminating the legacy of the excess of NPLs, 
making the ratio of unreserved NPLs to own funds (Net NPL/TC) 
converge towards a physiological level. Solving this problem is 
necessary in order to restore the ability of capital to absorb eventual 
losses and to reduce the negative impact of NPLs on profitability. 
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Limiting the analysis to the legacy problem would, however, mean 
to overlook that the accumulation of NPLs comes from bank 
profitability being increasingly less able to face extraordinary events 
like the recent crisis. Especially in the Italian case, it shows an inability 
to deal with the relatively higher structural degree of risk of the 
reference markets. If we also consider the operational and 
profitability challenges stemming from technological changes and 
from the entry of new and keen competitors, ensuring the long-term 
viability of the European and particularly Italian banks emerges as a 
crucial issue for bankers and regulatory and supervisory authorities. 
Since the main causes, effects, and solutions of NPLs continue to 
be of a predominantly national character, due to the heterogeneity of 
the EU banking systems and the incomplete Banking Union, the 
analysis should focus on single countries. 
In what follows, the Italian case is analysed. We start by 
considering the EU and some peer countries of the euro area as 
references for a preliminary comparative assessment of the Italian 
aggregate banking sector; the significance of such assessment is made 
more pronounced by comparing the EU averages with those of the USA 
(section 1). The justification for this type of analysis comes from the 
need to understand if, for crucial aspects, the Italian system has been 
and continues to be a marked outlier with respect to the EU average, 
and if the latter is in turn a conspicuous outlier with respect to the best 
international standards. If aggregate data would confirm this 
hypothesis, the possible variability hidden by those system averages 
would hardly justify a soft supervisory approach to the Italian 
problems. The international comparison confirms that the Italian 
system presents relevant negative anomalies, which can be ascribed 
to the impact that the economic, institutional and managerial factors 
mentioned above have exerted and continue to exert on bank 
profitability and capitalisation. 
In order to go beyond what aggregate data suggest, and to verify 
if they reflect either the performance of few bad apples or more 
widespread problems, we have built a large sample of 410 Italian 
domestic credit institutions, banks groups and independent banks, 
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and submitted them to two exercises, a stress test devoted to the 
convergence of Net NPL/TC towards the EU average (section 2), and a 
viability test (section 3) aimed at ascertaining whether only solving 
the NPL overhang would leave relevant fragilities unresolved. The 
results of the two tests confirm that the NPL legacy and the viability 
problems are widespread phenomena. More importantly, they show 
that solving the first does not overcome the unviability of the current 
bank business models, characterised by wide operational 
inefficiencies. The solution to both problems requires a systemic 
approach, timely interventions, and significant changes in the current 
regulatory and supervisory approach (section 4). The article 
concludes with a synthetic summing up of our results, after briefly 
comparing our proposal with contributions recently put forward on 
the NPL overhang. 
 
 
1. A comparative assessment of the vulnerability of the Italian 
banking system  
 
The international debate concerning the vulnerability of Italian 
banks, and its impact on the credibility of the Banking Union and its 
rules, has seen a rapid escalation in recent years s (Gros and de Groen, 
2016; Véron, 2016a and 2016b; Beck, 2017; Dombret, 2017). The 
policy and supervisory stance adopted when applying the new rules 
on crisis management and state aid to Italian banks is considered 
responsible for the difficulties to solve the NPL problem, to the extent 
that Italian banks might become a systemic risk for the entire euro 
area. A different narrative is proposed by the Italian supervisors. 
Although being the product of the gravest recession that the country 
experienced since the Second World War, the NPLs legacy problem 
seriously affects only a reduced number of banks; solving their excess 
of toxic assets would leave the system free of their threat. 
Furthermore, such solution had been rendered more difficult by the 
rigidity with which the new recovery and resolution procedures were 
applied, especially inside the banking union. “Italy is paying the 
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highest price because it has been cornered by the new approach -no 
more bail-outs, only bail-in – just when its banks’ NPLs were piling up 
owing the gravity of the double-digit recession, heightened in some 
case by mismanagement and even outright criminal behaviour” (Rossi, 
2017, p. 4). 
However, both positions fail to recognize that the vulnerability of 
the Italian banking sector precedes the recent crisis and that it is 
caused not only by cyclical factors, but predominantly by structural 
ones, which risk being underestimated by focusing on NPLs and the 
legacy of the crisis. 
The comparison between aggregate data of Italian and EU banks 
helps understand the scale and nature of the specific fragilities of the 
former. Two important caveats must be borne in mind. First, the 
aggregate analysis does not detect the variability within the banking 
sector of each country, which might be significant despite common 
macroeconomic and institutional conditions. For Italy, the 
disaggregated analysis presented in sections 2 and 3 permits to 
overcome this limit. Second, we must ascertain that the comparison 
with Europe allows to detect the effective divergence of the Italian 
banking system with respect to the best international standards.1 
Almost ten years after the outbreak of the crisis, EU banks still 
present significant fragilities and their low profitability remains a 
source of concern for public authorities and markets (IMF, 2017a; 
EBA, 2016; ESRB, 2016). It follows that if, as we shall see, Italy is an 
outlier with respect to the EU, its convergence towards the EU average 
would certainly be a significant progress, although not enough to 
move close to the best international standards. 
As shown in figure 1, the comparison of the post-crisis EU and US 
profitability paths is enlightening.2 
                                                             
1 Following the IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators, we select the United States as the 
representative country for the best international standards. 
2 The following identities and definitions referred to the main components of ROA and 
ROE are presented in order to clarify the terminology utilised in the present work. 
Total assets = TA; Net interest margin/TA + Net non-interest margin/TA = Operating 
revenues/TA; Pre-provision operating profit/TA = PPOP/TA = Operating 
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Note: from now on, data always refer to consolidated financial statements of domestic banks. 
Sources: for the EU, European Central Bank (ECB), Statistical Data Warehouse; for the USA, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), All Insured Banks. 
 
Although the effects of the crisis have been more immediate and 
violent for the US banks, their profitability soon began to increase 
regaining pre-crisis levels within few years. Instead, due to a ROA 
roughly one fifth of that of US banks, the EU banking system is not still 
able to generate a ROE in line with what markets require, despite an 
average leverage level more than two times that of US banks 
(Constâncio, 2016). The decrease of income streams in the post-crisis 
period, due to the shrinking of the more profitable loans, low interest 
rates and the flattening of the yield curve, has not been adequately 
compensated by the reduction of operational costs. 
The low bank profitability also explains why Europe encountered 
more difficulties in adopting effective strategies for the timely solution 
                                                             
revenues/TA – Total operating expenses/TA; ROA = Profit/TA = PPOP/TA – 
Provisions/TA – Tax expenses/TA; Leverage = L = TA/Total equity; ROE = ROA * L. 
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of the huge weight of bad loans inherited from the crisis. At the end of 
2016, NPLs amounted to over a trillion euro, around 6.7% of EU 
nominal GDP, with the average ratio of NPLs to gross loans (NPL ratio) 
at 5.1%, roughly three times higher than that of the USA. However, the 
average value of the NPL ratio does not give a faithful picture of the 
problem because of the large variation across EU countries, ranging 
from 1% to 46% (EBA, 2017c). In the six currently most affected euro 
countries,3 among which Italy stands as the sole major one, the NPL 
ratio is higher than 10% and shows a slow downward adjustment with 
respect to the 2014 peak. For this aspect, too, the comparison between 
the EU and US is interesting (figure 2). 
From 2007 to 2009, the NPL ratio increased in both areas. The 
trends began to diverge starting from 2010, with a rapid decrease in 
the US while EU banks continued to accumulate NPLs.4 Much of this 
divergence is due to the stricter rules that US supervisors impose on 
banks for promptly recognising loan losses by writing-off 
uncollectable bad loans after six months (Aiyar et al., 2016, p. 83).5 
This requirement limits the banks’ managerial discretion, imposing 
higher costs of provisioning  directed  at  matching the increase of the 
NPL ratio with the increase of loan loss reserves. The result has been 
to accelerate the cleaning up of the balance sheets of US banks, 
removing the incentives to delay the restructuration or liquidation of 
impaired loans. However, it is easier to impose such harsh measures 
where, as in the US, banks start with a high coverage ratio (loan loss 
reserves/gross impaired loans) and good profitability. On the contrary, 
                                                             
3 Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia (see EBA, 2017c). 
4 The NPL ratio of US banks, calculated from FDIC data, underestimates the real 
dimension of credit deterioration produced by the 2008 crisis. In particular, FDIC data 
do not include the large share of family mortgage in delinquency status held by the 
two government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, which in 2008 
owned or guaranteed about 40% of all US mortgages. 
5 According to Aiyar et al. (2016, p. 57), both the average write-off rates and 
provisioning levels in the euro area are much lower than in the US.  
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Figure 2 – NPL ratio and cost of risk in the EU and US (%)6 
 
 
Note: the missing 2014 value is estimated by the ECB.  
Sources: for EU banks, ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse; for the USA, FDIC, All Insured Banks.  
 
in Europe the low profitability has restricted banks’ ability to cover 
the higher cost of risk with higher provisioning and to timely recognise 
the loss with appropriate write-offs.7 Fear of the unsustainability of a 
more conservative provisioning has held back sharper supervisory 
interventions just in countries with more serious legacy problems 
(Véron, 2016a).8 The EU under-provisioning is highlighted by the very 
                                                             
6 The EU for NPL ratio are approximated by the ratio of Gross non-performing debt 
instruments to Total gross debt instruments. In the years under investigation, the EU 
indicator underestimates the NPL ratio. The cost of risk is the ratio of Provisions for 
loan losses/Total loans. 
7 In many European countries, limits to tax deductibility of loan loss provisions and 
write-offs are other relevant obstacles to the resolution of NPLs.  
8 According to a study produced by the ECB (2017a), the majority of supervisors in EU 
countries with high NPLs did not issue binding rules on write-offs, or, in general, on 
adequate provisioning. EU banks’ provisioning practices follow the International 
Accounting Standards Board approach, which “could result in insufficient and delayed 
provisioning and could therefore be an obstacle to adequate NPL measurement within 
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low correlation between the NPL ratio and the cost of provisioning 
(0.16), especially when compared with the US one (0.76) (see figure 
2). This largely explains why the EU NPL problem has become chronic 
and difficult to solve.9 
The main fragilities exhibited by the above comparison of the 
European and US banking systems are accentuated in the Italian case, 
thus reinforcing their influence and constraints on the effectiveness of 
regulation and supervision and on the viability of the banking business 
models. One unquestionable explanation of the greater weaknesses of 
the Italian banking system is the fact that the Italian economy was, 
among the major EU countries, the hardest hit by the recent long 
recession, especially in the period 2009-2013. Nevertheless, the 
impact of the crisis has been amplified by elements of structural 
vulnerability rooted in the past. This is particularly true for the two 
main profiles from which the solvency and profitability gaps with 
respect to the EU average derives: the overhang of NPLs and high 
operating costs. 
                                                             
loan portfolios” (ibid. p. 8). The recent ECB (2017b) proposed addendum to the NPL 
guidelines marks a relevant change in the direction advocated in the present paper, 
even if adopting long terms - the write-off of unsecured NPLs within two years and 
within seven years of secured ones – and applying the rule to loans that become non-
performing starting from January 2018. 
9 Only in 2017, when the goal of reducing the high levels of NPLs held by European 
banks became a political priority, the European authorities recognised that European 
banks have less regulatory incentives to deal proactively with NPLs compared to US 
banks. While the CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 104) and the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation (Article 16) explicitly confer to supervisors 
the powers to require institutions to adopt adequate provisioning policies, the 
European framework of accounting standards does not allow supervisors to intervene 
on accounting rules, thus limiting the usability of those powers. The Report of the 
Subgroup on Non-Performing Loans of the Council’s Financial Services Committee 
(Council of the European Union 2017) has proposed different options for addressing 
“the possible disconnect between the accounting and the desired prudential 
outcomes”, among which empowering supervisors with the capacity to “enforce 
accounting adjustments as regards NPL recognition, provisioning and write-offs” (§ 
186, p. 52; § 197-201, pp. 55-56). See also the previous footnote 8 on ECB 
interventions in the sphere of the SSM. 
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The heavy load of the NPL legacy, about 21% of nominal GDP in 
2016 (IMF, 2017b, p. 4), is strongly connected to dependence of Italian 
banks on retail credit, which constitutes their prevalent business 
model, and on the fragility of the Italian economy (Lusignani and 
Onado, 2014). The small size of non-financial firms, their excessive 
leverage and the underdevelopment of its capital market have 
contributed to maintain the quantitative centrality of banks in 
financing the economy. This largely explains why Italian recessions 
are characterized by the strong growth of the NPL ratio and by the 
worsening of bank profitability (Albertazzi et al., 2016). Figure 3 
shows that NPLs have always been a more significant problem for the 
Italian banks than for the banks of the other main EU countries.10 
The post-crisis dynamics of the NPL ratio is also significantly due to 
the lengthy and inefficient Italian judicial system to resolve insolvency 
and to enforce the repossession of collaterals. In addition, up to 2015 
the taxation system disincentivized banks from operating adequate 
provisioning and write-offs (Jassaud and Kang, 2015).11 However, 
despite the increasing competitive pressure (Ciocca, 2005, p. 22 ff.) 
and the relevant restructuring and consolidation started in the mid- 
1990s (Focarelli et al., 2004; Montanaro  and  Tonveronachi, 2006), 
Italian banks did not improve their risk management, at least not to 
the extent that was required for decreasing their vulnerability with 
respect to structural and cyclical factors. Starting in 2009, when the 
recession and the decline in the supply of credit began their course, 
the divergence of the NPL ratio between Italy and the EU average has 
been dramatically expanding. 
 
                                                             
10 Caution is necessary when comparing NPL ratios at the international level because 
NPLs are not homogeneously defined. Only recently, the BCBS (2017) issued the 
harmonised definition of non-performing exposures and forbearance. 
11 The reforms adopted in Italy in 2015 and 2016 should accelerate the timing for 
recovery of credit and facilitate the processes of foreclosure, although their full effects 
will be felt only in the medium-long term (Marcucci et al.,2015). Thanks to 2015 tax 
reform, Italian banks are now allowed to fully deduct loan losses provisions from 
taxable income in the year for which they are accounted for, instead of having to 
spread deductions over five years (it was eighteen years until 2013).  
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Figure 3 – NPL ratio (%) 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
A positive signal is coming from the recent decrease of the NPL 
ratio, resulting from both the lower inflow of impaired loans due to the 
economic recovery, and to the higher outflow in the form of sales to 
the market made possible by the higher coverage ratios (Bank of Italy, 
2017a; Panetta, 2017). Nevertheless, to perceive the effective 
dimension of the bank vulnerability due to the NPL dynamics, more 
significant than the NPL ratio is the ratio of net NPLs on supervisory 
capital (Net NPL/TC), which measures the risk that eventual losses on 
uncovered NPL will erode the capital.12 Figure 4 shows the dramatic 
                                                             
12 This indicator is akin to the Texas ratio, which compares gross NPLs to the resources 
available to cover losses, i.e. capital and reserves. Even if part of the losses could be 
also covered by the guarantees, which represent a further cushion of safety, these 
guarantees normally lose value in periods of crisis for loans to non-financial firms, 
which produce the highest share of NPL in Italy. In addition, in Italy the difficulty to 
rapidly enforce and liquidate the guarantees is still particularly high in comparison to 
most EU countries (Angeloni, 2016). 
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divergence of Italy with respect to the EU average and some peer 
countries for this indicator.13 
 
Figure 4 – Net non-performing debt instruments/total capital (%) 
 
 
Note: For the EU, the 2014 value is missing. 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse.  
 
In Italy, the share of own funds in excess of unexpected losses on 
NPLs was, in 2016, lower than 15%, compared to a EU average of 75%. 
As it emerges with more detail from figure 5, the higher vulnerability 
is the result not only of an NPL ratio higher than the EU average, but 
also of the practice of under-provisioning adopted by Italian banks 
during the worst years of the crisis as a consequence of their low 
profitability and capitalisation.14 The coverage ratio begins to increase 
only in 2013, in view of the ECB asset quality review of the subsequent 
                                                             
13 As already explained in footnote 4, the ECB statistics include in the indicator non-
performing debt instruments, not just loans. Furthermore, they cover only a sample 
of domestic banks. Therefore, these values are not perfectly comparable with those of 
figure 5, built on NPL data from the Bank of Italy. 
14 The correlation between the coverage ratio and the NPL ratio is negative and not 
significant (–0.096). 
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Figure 5 – Italy: NPLs and capital vulnerability 
 
 
Source: Bank of Italy, Annual Relations. 
 
Even if the coverage ratio has reached in recent years levels 
somewhat higher than the EU average (Panetta, 2017), the Italian 
vulnerability gap with the EU, due to NPLs, did not decrease 
significantly because during the same period its rate of growth of 
capitalisation was lower than the EU average. This partly derives from 
having benefited from limited public aid, while domestic banks of 
                                                             
15 At least since 2013 the IMF informed that the coverage ratio of the Italian banks was 
inadequate and that the necessary substantial increase of provisioning was a difficult 
challenge “given the continuing deterioration of asset quality and the Italian banks’ 
low profitability” (IMF, 2013, pp. 13-14). 
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other EU countries received more massive aid in the period 2008-
2015.16 The lower capital ratios of the Italian banks also reflect the 
higher RWA density17 due to the high weight of NPLs and, more 
recently, the large losses suffered when pre-provision operating 
profits were not enough to cover provisions. 
An explanation of the causes responsible of the deficient 
profitability of the Italian banking system is then necessary. The 
positive gap of the Italian operating revenues/TA in comparison to the 
averages of the EU and less risky countries, such as Germany and 
France, remained more or less stable during the post crisis period 
(figure 6). 
The almost constant Italian unitary operating revenues are, however, 
the result of the opposite paths of its two components, unitary interest 
and non-interest margins. Starting from 2008, the net advantage of 
Italian banks for the interest margin, which was the main component 
of its profitability, has progressively decreased in comparison  with  
the  other  main  EU  countries,  mainly  due  to  the strong decrease of 
the spread between the return on loans and the cost of funding 
(Albertazzi et al., 2015). This trend is theoretically unexpected 
because it occurred in a period of increased risks on loans. Plausible 
explanations of the widespread under-pricing of risk are an excess of 
price-competition and/or the preference for credit rationing with 
respect to rate increases, which would have further worsened the 
                                                             
16 In the period 2008-2015 EU banks received 654.2 billion euro of state aid for 
recapitalization and impaired asset measures, of which 144 billion in Germany, 140 
billion in the UK, 94.7 billion in Spain (European Commission 2016). In Italy, public 
intervention has been much lower, equal to 11.8 billion. According to Bank of Italy, at 
the end of 2011, when the NPL ratio was reaching 12%, “[…] ‘a system wide’ 
intervention […], involving substantial public funds along the lines of what occurred 
in other countries, appeared neither justified nor feasible. The increase in bad loans 
was not concentrated in any specific sector of the economy; the macroeconomic 
predictions made in the course of 2012 were much more favourable than results 
actually achieved. As the sovereign debt market strains grew more acute, government 
intervention on non-performing loans appeared incompatible with the state of public 
finance” (Bank of Italy, 2017a, p. 12). 
17 The RWA density, or density ratio, is the average risk weight per unit of exposure. 
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financial conditions of borrowers and consequently the volume of 
NPLs. The low profitability of lending explains the increasing reliance 
of Italian banks on fees and commissions. The revenues diversification 
strategy, which often supervisors suggest as the most effective to 
strengthen profitability (Constâncio, 2017a; Dombret, 2017b),18 was 
aggressively adopted by the Italian banks, managing in this way to 
compensate the contraction of the interest margin. 
 
Figure 6 – Operating revenues/TA (%) 
 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
 
However, the stable advantage for operative revenues was in the 
same period contrasted by the efficiency deficit, which, as shown by 
                                                             
18 Experience shows that this strategy does not protect from ample fluctuations with 
changing macroeconomic scenarios (Kok et al., 2016). The sharp contraction of non-
interest income of Italian banks in 2016 in comparison to the 2015 peak is an example. 
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figure 7 has heavily affected the structural fragility of the Italian 
banking system for a long time.19 
Figure 7 – Total operating expenses/TA (%) 
 
 
Source: OECD (2011), Bank Profitability: Financial Statement of Banks 2010, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/bank_fin-2010-en-fr 
 
In the absence of an increase in revenues, the generation of a 
profitability capable of hedging the recent increase of the costs of risk 
would have required of Italian banks to substantially reduce unitary 
operating expenses by improving the productivity of labour and of the 
branch network. As shown by figures 8 and 9, this did not happen and, 
on the contrary, the gap with respect to the EU and other main 
countries recently widened. 
 
 
                                                             
19 OCDE data on operative expenses are not perfectly comparable with those of the 
ECB utilized in figure 8. For Italy, in particular, OCDE data refer to non-consolidated 
balance sheets of domestic and foreign banks, while ECB data refer to consolidated 
balance sheets for a sample of domestic banks. 
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Figure 8 – Staff expenditure/TA (%) 
 
 
Note: Data of Staff expenditure/TA for Germany prior to 2014 are patently anomalous (they 
would range from 0.25 to 0.32 in the period 2008-2013, while they range from 0.69 to 0.72 in 
the remaining period). Given that this anomaly strongly affects the EU average, for Germany and 
the EU both indicators are shown only since 2014. 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse.  
 
The rationalisation of the branch network and the decrease of 
employees that started in 2008, often in conjunction with 
deleveraging processes and the reduction of non-core assets, do not 
yet show significant effects on unitary costs, probably because they 
are not associated with a rise in productivity. If productivity does not 
increase for lack of professionality and technological investments, a 
reduction in the number of employees may lead to a reduction of total 
assets more accentuated than the reduction of staff expenditure. A 
similar argument applies to the branch network. In general, beyond 
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Figure 9 – Total operating expenses/TA (%) 
 
 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
beyond not being immediate, efficiency gains coming from 
restructuring measures require changes in operating models, 
improvements in multichannel distribution structures and in 
information technology, which normally entail additional short-term 
costs. While the recent widening of the Italian gap with respect to the 
EU might come from the more severe effects of the recent crisis, the 
permanence of the observed structural gap would limit the ability of 
the Italian banks to adapt their business models, making them more 
vulnerable to risks and to the competitive challenges of the new 
financial environment. The increase of regulatory costs in the post-
crisis period, which penalises smaller banks because largely size-
invariant, have made even more relevant the problems of structural 
inefficiency and the pressure exercised by the shadow banking and the 
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innovative intermediation circuits, such as Fintech firms, on revenues 
per unit of assets. 
The efficiency gap has then eroded the advantages coming from 
unitary revenues that traditionally benefited the Italian banking 
system. With operating revenues/TA in line with Spain, the highest 
unitary operating expenses of the Italian system among the countries 
of our sample have increasingly pushed its PPOP/TA significantly 
closer to much less risky countries (figure 10).20 
 
Figure 10 – Pre-provision operating profit/TA (%) 
 
 
Note: The EU 2014 value is an ECB estimation. 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse.  
 
                                                             
20 According to the Bank of Italy (2017c, p. 170), the sharp 2016 decline of PPOP/TA 
is imputable to non-recurring provisions incurred by the largest banks for costs 
related to voluntary redundancy incentive plans (Bank of Italy, 2017c, p. 170). This 
might explain the significant 2016 increase of staff expenditure/TA of figure 8, but 
hardly the upward trend of total operating expenditure/TA experienced since 2014 
as shown in figure 9. 
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The long-term comparatively higher Italian NPL ratio shown in 
figure 3 suggests that Italian banks suffer from a structural deficit of 
PPOP/TA when considered in relation to the risk of their reference 
market. The considerable increase of credit losses produced by the 
recent crisis has highlighted this deficit and the resulting vicious loop 
between the increase of NPLs and the decrease of PPOP/TA, which 
was aggravated by the concurrent worsening of costs. The level of 
PPOP/TA should cover the unitary cost of risk and a ROA capable of 
generating a capital return in line with what the market requires, 
given regulatory and operative limit to leverage. Figure 11 shows that 
starting from 2011, PPOP could not even just cover charges for 
impairment and provision, thus producing capital losses and the rapid 
increase of Net NPL/TC (figure 5). 
 
Figure 11 – Pre-provision operating profit/provisions 
 
 
Note: The EU 2014 value is missing. For Germany, the values for the period 2008-2014 refer only 
to impairments and the value for 2011 (11.86) is omitted because patently anomalous. 
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse.  
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As a consequence, in the years that followed the outbreak of the 
crisis the Italian ROA was almost always in negative territory, even 
without a manifest systemic crisis as, for example, happened in Spain 
(figure 12). 
The dynamics of ROA manifestly reflects the structural inability of the 
Italian banking system to face the  comparatively higher risk of their 
market. To a large extent this also explains the difficulty of more 
incisive interventions by banks and their supervisors to clean banks’ 
balance sheet from the excess of NPLs. 
 
 
Figure 12 – ROA (%) 
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2. Dealing with the legacy problem 
 
In the previous section we focused on two indicators of bank’s 
fragility. The first, the ratio of net NPLs on own funds (Net NPL/TC), 
mainly refers to the legacy of the recent crisis. However, the ability to 
quickly adjust this fragility indicator to a normal level also measures 
the ability to withstand new future crises. The second, the ratio of pre-
provision operating profit on total asset (PPOP/TA), refers to the long-
term viability of banks, being the amount of resources that are 
available for internal growth once the cost of risks and the cost of 
capital are met. On both accounts, EU banks suffer from a much higher 
structural fragility than the US ones, which have shown the ability to 
quickly absorb the effects of the crisis and go back to their less fragile 
configuration. 
In managing ex ante and ex post credit risks, Italian banks are 
among the more serious outliers in the EU context, not being able to 
price risks consistently with a riskier environment than that of their 
peers. The recent crisis has just exposed a pre-existing long-term 
problem, that is the weakness of the Italian banks to cope with the 
weaknesses of their domestic market. 
This is what the aggregate data of the previous section have 
shown. The above suggestion of structural problems pervading the 
Italian banking system excludes that its performance is due to just few 
bad apples. A proprietary database that includes a large sample of 
Italian banks helps to verify our hypothesis. The sample covers the 
90% of 2016 Bank of Italy’s data for domestic banks’ total assets. The 
coverage for bank typology is shown in table 1.21  
                                                             
21 Based on Bureau van Dijk (BVD) Orbis Bank Focus, the database includes 
consolidated information on 410 domestic banking groups and independent banks, 
which do not include subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks. This exclusion is 
justified by our attention to recapitalisation processes potentially in charge of the 
Italian government. In any case, their introduction into the sample would not change 
the substance of the results presented in the present and next sections. We have 
excluded from the sample Banca Monte dei Paschi, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and 
Veneto Banca, whose crisis has been recently dealt with and about which we do not 
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Table 1 – Sample’s coverage according to bank typology 
 
Bank typology Number 
TA as % of 
the sector’s 
total 
Joint stock companies and Banche popolari, 
all termed OBs 
94 89.6 
BCCs (cooperative banks) 271 
95.5 
Raiffeisen banks, RBs (cooperative banks) 45 
 
 
Figure 13 shows how the banks in the sample are positioned with 
respect to the EU averages for Net NPL/TC and PPOP/TA for the year 
2016.22  
Figure 13 confirms that the overwhelming majority of Italian 
banks face a serious legacy problem. Furthermore, the banks 
positioned in the NW quadrant add deficiency of PPOP/TA to the 
legacy problem. The seriousness of the conditions of Italian banks is 
accentuated if we consider that the two EU averages significantly 
diverge from the US ones, amounting to 0.59% for Net NPL/TC and to 
1.74% for PPOP/TA.  
Figure 14, which substitutes the EU averages of figure 13 with the 
US ones, shows that most Italian banks are placed in the NW quadrant, 








                                                             
have enough updated information to perform our tests. The entire list of banks 
included in the sample is available on request. 
22 The EU averages for the aggregate of domestic banks are respectively 26% and 
0.75%. 
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Figure 13 – Percentage deviations of Net NPL/TC and PPOP/TA from 
EU averages, 2016 
 
 
Sources: BVD, Orbis Bank Focus and ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
 
From the previous figures, we also deduce that something deeply 
wrong lies at the heart of the Basel methods for measuring risk-
sensitive capital requirements. No banks, even those with Net NPL/TC 
higher than 100%, show regulatory capital deficiency under Pillar 1. 
Measuring, as we have done, the profitability-viability based on 
the data of just one year could seem inappropriate. We will go back to 
this issue in the next section. However, it is clear from the past trend 
that the majority of Italian banks lack the perspective cash flow 
necessary to deal with their NPL problem in a reasonable time 
horizon. This means that a shock therapy rather than a gradual 
approach is needed. 
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Figure 14 – Percentage deviations of Net NPLs/TC and PPOP/TA from 
US averages, 2016 
 
 
Sources: BVD, Orbis Bank Focus and FDIC. 
 
The Net NPL/TC and PPOP/TA ratios are the two critical 
vulnerability variables on which we build the two exercises. 
Postponing the viability test based on PPOP/TA to the next section, in 
the present section we propose a stress test aimed at exploring the 
consequences of instantly adjusting banks’ balance-sheet applying 
two EU standards related to NPLs. In accordance with the provisions 
of Basel Core Principles23 and EU supervisory rules (CRD IV and SSM 
                                                             
23 The Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2012, p. 45, 
footnote 59) explicitly point out that “[i]n assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital 
levels in light of its risk profile, the supervisor critically focuses, among other things, 
on […] the adequacy of provisions and reserves to cover losses expected on its 
exposures […]”. Therefore, “[t]he supervisors determines that banks have appropriate 
policies and processes to ensure that provisions and write-offs are timely and reflect 
realistic repayment and recovery expectations, taking into account market and 
macroeconomic conditions” (ibid., Principle 18, Essential criteria 4, p. 48). 
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regulation), the rationale of the proposal is that supervisors should be 
empowered to enforce accounting adjustments regarding NPL write-
offs in order to avoid overstatements of bank’s own funds and the risks 
for financial stability arising from a large number of banks 
overburdened by toxic assets. The above mentioned new stance of the 
ECB (2017b) confirms that, if willing, supervisors are empowered 
with this instrument. 
The entire sample of domestic banks is divided in three sectors, 
including joint stock banks and Banche Popolari (OBs), credit 
cooperative banks (BCCs), and Raiffeisen banks (RBs), which are 
cooperative banks whose reference territory are the autonomous 
provinces of Bolzano and Trento.24 The two subsets of cooperative 
banks need special attention. A recent reform25 obliges cooperative 
banks to consolidate in a group, with a central institution as the parent 
company. BCCs are entitled to choose between ICCREA Banca or Cassa 
Centrale Banca; RBs may select either Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen of Alto 
Adige or one of the other two groups.26 Differently from traditional 
banking groups, where the holding company own the subsidiaries, in 
the cooperative group the affiliated banks own the central institution. 
One of the most relevant feature of the reform is the relationship 
between the parent company and the affiliated banks. Linked by the 
so-called “cohesion contract”, the parent company and the 
consolidated banks are committed to provide reciprocal guarantee for 
each other’s liabilities. This implies that if an affiliated bank must be 
                                                             
24 From the BCC and RB sectors the three central institutions are excluded for the 
reasons specified below and in footnote 28. 
25 See law no. 49/2016 and the secondary regulation issued by the Bank of Italy on 2 
November 2016 (“Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo”). For a synthetic analysis of the 
reform, see Bank of Italy (2016, pp. 44-45). 
26 BCCs with assets higher than 2 billion euro could have chosen to become joint stock 
companies. Being this option very costly, only BCC Cambiano decided to utilise it, 
changing into Banca Cambiano S.p.A. The Central Institutions that will be authorized 
to become the parent company of a cooperative banking group will be incorporated 
as joint stock companies in order to improve the access of cooperative banks to the 
capital market. However, the majority of voting rights must be held by the affiliated 
banks. 
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recapitalised, the parent company is authorised to utilise the capital 
surplus of the other member banks under a proportionality criterion. 
If the required funds exceed this surplus, the parent company can tap 
the market for additional resources. Thanks to the intrusive power on 
strategic direction and risk management conferred to the parent 
company, the consolidation of cooperative banks is intended not only 
to remedy possible under-capitalization problems, but also to improve 
the efficiency and structural rigidities of these small and micro-banks, 
reducing the role of local vested interests and enhancing their 
governance (Weber, 2017).27 Not yet being available the lists of the 
membership of the parent companies, table 2 groups the cooperative 
banks into the BCC and RB sectors.28  
 
Table 2 – Indicators for the sample and the three sectors, 2016 
 
Indicators Sample OBs BCCs RBs 
Number of banks 410 94 271 45 
Total assets (billion euro) 2,713 2,505 194 14 
TA as % of TA of the sample 100 92.3 7.2 0.5 
Net NPL/TC (%) 64.8 65.0 67.3 24.1 
NPL ratio (%) 15.9 15.6 19.1 8.4 
Coverage ratio (%) 54.0 54.4 50.4 42.0 
CET1 ratio (%) 11.7 11.2 16.6 17.9 
Tier 1 ratio (%) 12.3 11.8 16.7 17.9 
TC ratio (%) 14.5 14.3 17.0 18.1 
Source: BVD, Orbis Bank Focus. 
                                                             
27 This explains why the Banche popolari are considered into the OB sector: not yet 
transformed into joint stock companies, they remain a special sort of mutual banks 
with a central institution lacking the functions conferred to the new cooperative 
groups. 
28 Due to the incoming process that is profoundly changing the nature, operations, and 
balance sheets of the three central institutions, they are excluded from the data of the 
respective sectors. In any case, no need of recapitalisation appears when applying our 
exercise to their current configuration. 
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Table 2 shows that although it has decreased with respect to the 
2014 peak, the Net NPL/TC ratio remains at alarmingly high levels, 
especially for OBs and BCCs. At a first glance, it is already evident that 
adjusting that ratio to less risky prudential levels would strongly affect 
their capitalisation. The final target of the NPL stress test exercise, 
which is fully reached with the viability test presented in the next 
section, is to make Net NPL/TC converge towards the 26% level, which 
represents the EU average as measured by the ECB for a large sample 
of EU banks. 
The NPL stress test exercise that we propose is a two stages 
process. The first stage is the immediate adjustment of the balance 
sheet adopting the two adjustment factors shown in the table 3, whose 
levels come from the EU 2016 averages.29 
 
Table 3 – Target, adjustment factors and constraints of  
the NPL stress test 
 





Net NPL/TC ≤ 26   
NPL ratio  4.5  
Coverage ratio  44  
CET1 ratio   6.5 
Tier 1 ratio   8 
TC ratio   10 
 
Although the adjustment is made with an NPL ratio roughly a 
fourth of the 2016 Italian ratio, its level is significantly higher than the 
best international standards (see previous section). The new coverage 
                                                             
29 The value of the NPL ratio is the EU average (5.1%) net of countries with a ratio 
above 10%. Given that the NPL adjustment factor is applied to ex ante values, its post-
test level does not exactly coincide with the reference 4.5% because the amount of 
gross loans is modified as a consequence of the adjustment. This is not relevant for 
our analysis which focuses on the level of Net NPL/TC as the final target. 
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ratio is six percentage points below the Italian one, and much lower 
than its international standard.  
Furthermore, the two immediate adjustment factors constitute a 
weaker constraint than the final target. As we shall see below, one of 
the results of the NPL exercise is that several banks present a post-test 
level of Net NPL/TC higher than the 26% final target, especially for 
those that fail the test and need to be recapitalised. As we explain in 
the next section, the second stage of the NPL test forms part of the 
viability test, which includes five years of full convergence to the final 
26% target level of Net NPL/TC. In other words, to be admitted to the 
recapitalisation, the banks that fail the stress test must show to be 
viable also by incorporating the costs of this convergence. 
Although the adjustment due to the NPL ratio may appear drastic, 
the two adjustment factors fall well short of international standards. A 
more severe intervention would have required higher additions of 
capital, private and public, rendered rather problematic by economic 
and political reasons. Furthermore, as we will see in the next section, 
the second leg of our proposal is a more rigid viability test focused on 
the generation of internal resources as the crucial factor for reaching 
long-term systemic resilience. 
The adjustment process is formally described in Appendix 1. The 
purpose of the exercise is to compute, for each bank of the sample, the 
supervisory capital ratios resulting from adjusting its NPL ratio and 
coverage ratio to the values indicated in table 3. If the post-adjustment 
capitalisation is lower than the regulatory constraints specified in the 
same table, we compute the amount of the capital shortfall. First, we 
compute the new level of NPLs applying the NPL adjustment ratio 
equal to 4.5%, and its difference with respect to the current level. The 
excess of NPLs is divided in two parts. A 75% slice is written off30 and 
                                                             
30 Worth to note, the write-off of NPLs does not have to be preceded by the exhaustion 
of legal insolvency proceedings and by giving up contractual rights on these loans. A 
write-off “does not mean that the loan has absolutely no recovery or salvage value, but 
rather that is not practical or desirable to defer writing off this essentially worthless 
asset even though partial recovery may be realized in the future.” (Gaston and Song, 
2014, p. 29) 
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the remaining 25% goes to constitute what we call the capital bonus. 
The rationale of this criterion is that the excess of NPLs has a potential 
level of recovery that should not be eliminated from the evaluation of 
asset, hence of the capital. The larger share subject to the write-off 
would be mainly composed of bad loan and unrecoverable, unsecured 
vintage substandard loans. The smaller share, constituting the capital 
bonus, would include NPLs with high probability of full recovery.31 
Each bank would manage the 75% share as it finds convenient 
(internally or by selling it to the market); the remaining share would 
be managed internally and the supervisory authority would accept to 
add it to CET1 for no more than five years, hence the term capital 
bonus. Therefore, while the adjustment using the selected EU averages 
is immediate, banks have a grace period for recovering the best part 
of their NPLs.  
Second, we compute the excess of loan loss reserves, if any, at the 
new 44% coverage ratio and at the new, lower, level of NPLs. The loss 
is then the difference between the 75% slice of NPLs and the excess 
reserves. To arrive at the effect of the loss on regulatory capital ratios, 
we then compute the new level of risk weighted assets (RWA) 
assuming an average risk weight of 100% for the excess of NPL net of 
the excess reserves.32 The difference between the loss and the capital 
                                                             
31 The capital bonus measures the amount of (potential) gross losses that supervisors 
accept not to subtract from the current CET1 because of their high probability of being 
recovered, and are therefore added to CET1 after the capital adjustment described in 
the text. The percentage of 25% is quite conservative because, according to analysis 
of Bank of Italy (Panetta, 2017), of the 173 billion euro of the 2016 net NPLs, 92 billion 
are loans with high probability of going back to the performing status, especially with 
the expected consolidation of the economic recovery. If the evaluation by the Bank of 
Italy is correct, the rate of recovery from the whole excess of NPLs would exceed 25%, 
thus helping banks that should be recapitalised to pay back the funds received from 
the government. One of the objectives of the temporary nature of the capital bonus is 
to incentivize banks to utilise the new out-of-court restructuring tools introduced in 
Italy with the 2015 reforms, whose aim is promoting early solutions of borrowers’ 
financial difficulties and preventing their irreversible insolvency (Marcucci et al., 
2015). 
32 Due to the lack of data necessary to compute the changes of RWA for the banks that 
adopt the A-IRB method, we use for all banks the Basel standardized approach, which 
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bonus, both divided for RWA, is added to the existing regulatory 
capital ratios. If the resulting new capital ratios do not comply with the 
regulatory constraints shown in table 3.3, the stress test is failed and 
corrective recapitalisation should be forced on the bank. We compute 
the amount of capital shortfall as the higher of the three possible 
shortfalls. It is worth noting that the capitalisation thresholds that we 
propose for the stress test are higher than the minima dictated by 
Pillar 1, and higher than the minimum adopted by EBA for CET1 in its 
2014 stress test. This is because we have added a 2% to each of the 
three basic levels to take into account that the stress test only concerns 
NPLs. 
Banks passing the stress test might adopt their own strategy for 
reducing NPLs consistently with the expectations of supervisors. Under 
Pillar 2, one option for incentivising these banks to cleaning up their 
balance sheets could be to consider the capital add-on ‘suggested’ by the 
capital guidance as the amount coming from the massive write-offs of the 
proposed stress test; the cost in term of capital should be partially offset 
by the capital bonus and the further benefits coming from the higher 
market evaluation due to the cleansing of the balance-sheet. Anyway, as 
we will explain in the next section, also banks not presenting post-test 
capital deficits should be forced by supervisors to converge within five 
years towards the EU average of the Net NPL/TC. In any case, the post-
test results that we present below are computed extending the test to all 
banks, with the obvious exception of those already complying with the 
two adjustment factors. 
The results of the NPL stress test for the three sectors are shown 






                                                             
in most cases prescribes a risk weight of 100% for “past-due loans” (the regulatory 
term for NPLs), net of specific provisions and write-off. 
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Table 6 – Pre- and post-test indicators for the RB sector 
 







Number of banks 45 28 17 
TA as % of sample’s 
TA 




Pre-test Pre-test Post-test 
CET1 ratio (%) 17.9 17.1 19.9 16.1 14.3 
Tier 1 ratio (%) 17.9 17.1 19.9 16.1 14.3 
TC ratio (%) 18.1 17.2 20.0 16.3 14.6 
Net NPL/TC (%) 24.1 19.9 13.3 36.5 16.4 
 
 
The Raiffeisen sector comes out of the stress test unscathed. No 
RB needs to be recapitalised. RBs present the highest capitalisation 
and the least weight of NPLs. To be fair, their performance is 
significantly due to the fact that the province of Bolzano did not suffer 
the deep recession that hit the rest of the country. 
On the contrary, 78 banks of the other two sectors, representing 
around 20% of the asset of the sample, should be recapitalised. 
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Given the cohesion contract, the BCC sector could deal with the 
capital shortfall with internal resources.33 Its post-test indicators are 
positioned between the other two sectors, showing a still high level of 
the Net NPL/TC ratio for banks needing recapitalisation.34 The 
supervisory authorities should monitor that the two parent 
companies use their power to force their weaker members to 
undertake a more general overhaul of their business model. 
The OB sector presents the worst result for both the percentage 
of banks needing recapitalisation (28% against 19% of the BCC sector) 
and post-test indicators. Hardly, a significant amount of the funds 
required, around 10 billion euros, will come from the market, and 
judging from experience it would not be complemented with the right 
strings. 
If we consider that the banks in the sample are all Basel compliant, 
the proposed adjustment should be considered as a stress test based 
on NPLs, alternative to the ones currently done based on uncertain 
scenarios. The goal would be the same, that is to render individual 
banks more resilient with respect to eventual shocks. However, the 
approach would differ due to the systemic nature of our results. Given 
that many banks need capital injections as the result of the NPL 
adjustment, the intervention should be systemic and follow the 
approach of the prompt corrective action that supervisors are 
required to adopt to avoid banks going from a troubled to a failing 
state. Since the capital shortfall of the OB sector is the consequence of 
                                                             
33 Worth noting is that Italian supervisors may not have yet finalized their programme 
of on-site inspection for the less significant banks, mainly BCCs, from which we might 
eventually expect the emergence of higher NPLs and under-provisioning. However, 
the ECB will take the supervisory control of the two major cooperative groups and will 
undertake a further asset quality review of the parent companies and, at least, of the 
largest affiliated BCCs. The significant positive difference between the capital buffer 
and the capital shortfall of table 4 should be enough to cover a possible higher capital 
shortfall. 
34 A clarification concerning the three sectors is that even if a sector presents a post-
test average lower than 26%, several banks not needing recapitalisation exceed that 
level and must then adopt the further adjustment outlined before, connected to the 
viability test and which the next section is devoted to. 
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a stress test, the Italian authorities should be allowed to use public 
funds as precautionary capitalisation, thus avoiding entering 
resolution and bail-in procedures for senior creditors.35 In some cases, 
as it already happened in other EU countries, nationalisation could be 
the more efficient solution. In any case, public intervention should 
come with part of the conditionality of EU state aid rules, the ones that 
we referred to above as the right strings. First among them is to allow 
public intervention only for viable banks; hence, supervisors should 
question the viability of the banks needing recapitalisation. 
For both the OB and BCC sectors, 78 among the banks starting 
with high level of Net NPL/TC do not comply with the final 26% target 
after the adjustment and the consequent recapitalisation. Let us 
remember that the latter was established at abundantly higher levels 
than international standards. Computing the post-test deviations with 
respect to US (0.59%, 1.74%) and EU (26%, 0.75%) averages, figure 
15 shows that, despite the strong improvement with respect to the 
initial condition (figure 14), almost all banks should plan to 
progressively adjust to a much lower Net NPL/TC, although with 
different intensity. 
                                                             
35 The injection of public funds under precautionary recapitalization can cover capital 
shortfall of solvent banks deriving from unlikely losses in an adverse scenario of a 
stress test or an asset quality review, i.e. in our case adopting the EU averages of the 
NPL and coverage ratios as stress variables. The acceptability of the precautionary 
motive for our recapitalization seems to follow from what already happened with 
other Italian and Greek banks which failed previous asset quality review and stress 
tests. Moreover, it is also in line with other proposals aimed at solving the legacy 
problem (Enria, 2017a; 2017b). However, strictly speaking, it could be argued that the 
capital shortfall arising from forced supervisory write-offs would cover losses in 
excess of those anticipated by normal provisions, which should not be considered 
“unlikely”, at least from a supervisory perspective. According to Hellwig (2017, p. 22), 
the condition that the BRRD (“Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive”, Directive 
2014/59/EU) imposes on precautionary recapitalization, i.e. that it must not be used 
to offset losses that have occurred or are likely to occur in the immediate future, is 
“unrealistic [because] capital shortfalls in an asset quality review are the result of 
losses resulting from a revaluation of assets, e.g. loans where the review is more 
pessimistic about the prospect of recovery”. Along a similar line, Véron (2017, p. 10) 
notes that the condition that losses should be “unlikely” in the near future is rendered 
difficult to evaluate by the uncertainty on the quality of public auditing and the uneven 
implementation of accounting standards across EU countries. 
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Figure 15 – Post-test deviations of Net NPL/TC and PPOP/TA from US 
and EU averages  
 
 
Source: BVD, Orbis Bank Focus. 
 
Figure 15 shows the residual weakness affecting many banks 
after the adjustment and recapitalisation, even with reference to the 
weaker EU averages. The curious irrelevance of PPOP/TA with respect 
to the level of Net NPL/TC suggests that several banks with more 
internal resources to devote to cover the cost of risk (those positioned 
to the right of the EU and US average for PPOP/TA) have utilised the 
extra resources in other ways, a sign of the lack of the right strings. 
More serious is that most banks appear to lack enough internal 
resources to devote to a further adjustment towards the best EU and 
international standards. 
This leads to the issue which the next section is devoted to, that of 
the long-term viability of banks, defined as the ability of producing 
enough internal resources for further converging towards safer 
international standards and to sustain the financing of the economic 
growth of the country. 
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3. Testing viability 
 
When some decades ago it was decided, through the privatisation 
and the liberalisation of the banking sector, that banks, apart from a 
more intrusive regulation and supervision, are like any other firm, one 
of the argument in favour of such a move was to subject banks to the 
market discipline, meaning that they too must pass the market test of 
profitability and viability. However, given the opacity of bank balance-
sheets, the regulatory prudential framework, which has since then 
substituted previous structural interventions, recognises that the 
control exercised by the market (the third Pillar of the Basel 
framework) requires that supervisors attest the viability of each bank 
by verifying the continuous compliance with the rules of the first Pillar 
and the additional requirements coming from the second Pillar’s 
supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP). This is a 
demanding task for supervisors, but this is the system that was chosen 
and supervisory authorities should be endowed with appropriate 
resources and methodologies. 
As Minsky made it clear fifty years ago (Minsky 1967 and 1975), 
the viability exercise requires a forward-looking approach, in which 
banks, like any other firm, are evaluated according to their perspective 
ability to generate and distribute profits. The primary focus of 
supervision should then be the assessment of this type of viability. 
Existing capital is a short-term buffer against unexpected losses, but, 
even if abundant, it is quickly depleted by a relatively long string of 
losses. Firms’ long-term viability depends on their ability to generate 
positive net cash flows in future periods. Banks must, in addition, 
comply with regulatory minimum capital requirements, which means 
that they must generate enough internal resources for dynamically 
accompanying the growth of the economy. Their return on equity 
(ROE) potentially measures their capacity to grow and is normally 
split between the addition to current capital and the payment of 
dividends. Hence the level of ROE should be high enough to permit its 
retained share to serve the growth of the economy. This, at least, 
should be the physiology pursued by supervisors: banks must 
394  PSL Quarterly Review 
accompany the growth of the economy and must generate and retain 
enough resources to do it. The viability test that we propose in this 
section is then based on a target ROE, hence on the required flow of 
internal resources.36 
The NPL stress test of the previous section and the viability test 
should be considered in conjunction and become the dominant 
features of supervisors’ action under Basel’s Pillar 2.  
The purpose of the stress test was to check the viability of Italian 
banks with respect to the burden of NPLs inherited from the recent 
crisis. We have seen in sections 1 and 2 that Italian banks had not 
enough stock and flow resources to keep that burden within 
acceptable limits. Hence the need to tackle the NPL legacy problem 
resorting to external resources. We proposed in section 2 a stock 
adjustment concerning NPLs and reserves, an adjustment requiring 
the recapitalisation of a large share of the banking system and a 
temporary supervisory forbearance in the form of the capital bonus. 
However, since the Basel methodology on ex ante risk metrics does 
not seem to be able on its own to keep risks and NPLs from 
accumulating, supervisors’ action under Pillar 2 should add the 
obligation to keep Net NPLoans/TC, and more in general NPDebts/TC, 
below a certain threshold. With banks so constrained on ex ante and 
ex post risks, criticisms on metrics, such as our viability test, based on 
ROE because of its non-risk sensitivity should lose weight. 
                                                             
36 According to EBA’s Guidelines (2014, p. 40), central to the SREP is (or should be) 
the assessment of the viability of a bank’s business model, defined as the ability of the 
institution “to generate acceptable returns”, measured by ROE or other metrics, such 
as ROA or risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Similarly, when deciding whether 
to approve the feasibility of state aid and the restructuring plan of a bank needing 
public support, a key element of the European Commission’s evaluation is the 
assessment of its long-term viability, which is achieved if the bank “is able to cover all 
its costs including depreciation and financial charges and provide an appropriate 
return on equity, taking into account the risk profile of the bank” (European 
Commission, 2015, p. 2). 
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Table 7 shows the value of the reference parameters of the 
viability test that we propose.37 We have chosen a lower level of the 
target ROE for BCCs and RBs due to their mutualistic character that 
favours serving the local economy to profit distribution. 
 









OBs 13.5 15 0.9 0.59 1.49 
BCCs 10.5 15 0.7 0.59 1.29 
RBs 10.5 15 0.7 0.59 1.29 
 
As we have seen in the previous section, the post-test Net NPL/TC 
value is higher than the 26% final target level for several of the banks 
examined. For this reason, we add to the target PPOP/TA (table 7) a 
factor specific to each bank that represents the annual percentage 
addition to capital necessary to converge to the 26% level in five 
years.38 
For several reasons, hardly banks will regain the pre-crisis level 
of PPOP/TA. Even supposing an optimistic recovery scenario for the 
Italian economy, competitive pressure will be felt on income 
generation, pushing margins to converge towards the lower EU 
                                                             
37 The level of target ROE after tax is taken from the median of the responses given to 
the last Risk Assessment Questionnaire conducted by the EBA (2017a). See also 
Constâncio (2017a). The gross level is computed assuming a 25% income tax rate. The 
level of leverage corresponds to the 2016 EU average for domestic banks (ECB, 
Statistical Data Warehouse). The cost of risk is the pre-crisis Italian historical average 
(0.48%) increased by 22% in order to take into account the increase in the IFRS 9 
(International Financial Reporting Standard 9) provisioning as estimated by most 
banks in the EBA sample (EBA, 2017b). Particularly for the viability test, our exercises 
must be considered more from a methodological than from a quantitative perspective. 
With more granular information, supervisors might tailor the tests to the specific 
conditions of each bank. 
38 The five years period deliberately coincides with the grace period that we propose 
for the capital bonus. See Appendix 2 for the calculation of the additional factor. 
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average level (Weber, 2017). Italian supervisors and bankers agree 
that the time is over for high revenue margins allowing both large and 
small banks to be profitable adopting the traditional expensive 
business model (ABI, 2017; Visco, 2017). Optimistically, we can 
compare the target PPOP/TA to the 2015 level, a generally higher level 
than the one of the distressed 2016 year. Cleaning balance sheets from 
excessive NPLs should help in this direction. As figure 13 already 
suggested, even in these conditions not many banks would comply 
with the minimum of PPOP/TA of table 7. The reason of the 
insufficiency of PPOP/TA lies in the generally high level of unitary 
operating expenses (Op. Exp./TA) that we have discussed in section 1. 
To see whether a higher attainable operating efficiency would change 
the result, we compare for each bank the deviation of the 2015 
PPOP/TA from its target value with the deviation of the 2016 Op. 
Exp./TA from the respective EU average (1.44%). 
For OBs, the result the of test is shown in figure 16. 
Banks lying above the 45° line are or may become viable because they 
have potential unitary cost savings higher than the PPOP/TA shortfall. 
For banks that fail the NPL stress test, actual or potential viability is 
the necessary condition for being recapitalised. Of the 26 OBs needing 
recapitalisation, 14 fail the viability test. Supervisory authorities 
should  then  evaluate  either  the  necessity  to  resolve or liquidate 
them, or whether the specificity of their business model justifies 
deviating from our averages. However, other 27 OBs fail the test, some 
with small deficits that could be eliminated given that the reference to 
an average does not exclude minor margins of forbearance. In any 
case, given that 71 of the 94 banks of the sector would not comply with 
the more severe PPOP/TA constraint, the efficiency gap is clearly a 
widespread phenomenon; the failure of tackling inefficiencies would 
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The result of the viability test for the BCCs is shown in figure 17. 
Of the 68 BCCs that fail the viability test, 20 are in a critical 
condition needing recapitalisation. Many BCCs fail the test by just few 
basis points. Notwithstanding the lower ROE threshold, 162 of the 271 
BCCs fail the PPOP/TA constraint, showing that the efficiency gap is a 
widespread phenomenon for this sector too. 
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Figure 17 – Potential viability: BCCs 
 
 
Figure 18 – Potential viability: RBs 
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Although, as we have seen in the previous section, no RB fails the 
NPL test (largely due to the relatively good economic performance of 
the reference territory) a higher share of RBs than for OBs and BBCs 
fails both the PPOP/TA constraint and the viability test. Of the 45 RBs 
in the sample, 41 fail the PPOP/TA constraint and 28 fail the viability 
test. 
The results for the three sectors are synthetized in table 8. 
 
Table 8 – Results of the viability test 
 
 OBs BCCs RBs Total 
Total banks of the sector 94 271 45 410 
Banks failing the PPOP/TA 
constraint 
71 162 41 274 
Banks failing the viability test 41 69 28 137 
Banks needing recapitalisation 
and failing the viability test 
14 20 0 34 
 
Recently, a renewed push to M&As in the Italian banking sector is 
often explained by the same actors with the opportunity given by the 
larger size to exploit economies of scale. Figures 19, 20 and 21 show 
the existence of a significant dispersion of unitary costs for most levels 
of activity in the three banking sectors under consideration. This 
strengthens the case made in the viability test on the existence of 
significant room for eliminating inefficiencies. Once such inefficiencies 
are tackled, economies of scale either substantially disappear, as for 
OBs, or, for the lower sizes characterising average BCCs and RBs, 
become much less pronounced. As we have argued in section 1, the 
larger size does not help to increase PPOP/TA if not associated to 
higher investments in human capital and technology. 
Figures 22 and 23 suggest that the larger size due to M&As might, 
however, decrease the unitary operating revenues of BCCs and RBs. 
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Figure 21 – Economies of scale: RBs 
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In addition to the difficulties posed by M&As for reining on 
cultural, operative, and technical heterogeneities and on internal 
conflicts, local banks have to also pay attention to not lose their special 
links with the reference territory, which would weaken their 
specificity with respect to competing non-local banks. 
Considering that a significant increase of revenues opposing the 
tendency towards the EU average (section 1) cannot realistically be 
expected to occur, the above exercise shows the critical role of 
operating costs for the long-term viability of a large number of banks. 
The disaggregated analysis of the Italian banking sector clarifies that 
the overall efficiency gap with respect to peer EU countries (section 1) 
affects a large number of banks of different institutional type: a gap 
that cannot be closed by only resorting to M&As, especially above a 
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modest level of bank size. Often the cause of the higher unitary costs 
of the Italian banking system is imputed to the disproportion between 
the country’s degree of bankarisation (total assets/nominal GDP), 
which is lower with respect to that of other developed countries, and 
the large number of banks: hence the use of the term overbanking 
(Pagano et al., 2014). The argument obviously relies on the existence 
of significant economies of scale. The previous analysis, which prefers 
focusing on PPOP/TA,39 suggests that in the case of local banks, the 
economies of scale coming from M&As might be contrasted by losses 
in unitary revenues, leaving the viability problem unresolved. For 
larger banks, economies of scale are mostly absent. If, as the previous 
analysis suggests, the high costs are the result of inefficiencies, we 
should not speak of overbanking, but of an efficiency gap to impute to 




4. An alternative approach to regulation and supervision 
 
Given the rising pressure on revenues and costs coming from new 
technologies and new entrants, the viability gap resulting from the 
previous exercise is bound to increase and to become more diffuse, 
hence more systematically challenging. Since the problem does not 
only concern the Italian banking system,40 the increasing worry about 
the profitability of European banks is leading the supervisory 
authorities of the area to accentuate the focus of the SREP on the 
viability of the banks’ business models. What, however, it is not yet 
clear is the latitude of the effective powers given to supervisors by the 
current regulation to impose corrective measures to banks with long-
                                                             
39 The US example is illuminating because a higher PPOP/TA than in the EU is the 
result of higher unitary costs more than compensated by much higher unitary 
revenues. 
40 The poor profitability performance presented in the previous section 1 has been 
confirmed for German small and medium-sized banks by the results of a recent stress 
test performed by their national supervisor (Deutsche Bundesbank 2017). 
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term viability problems. Being part of Pillar 2, such intervention is left 
to the supervisors’ discretional judgment and is generally exerted 
prescribing capital add-ons and limits on dividend distribution, but 
only when the bank operates, or it is expected to operate, below 
regulatory and supervisory capital requirements.41 
Despite the significant increase of capital ratios due to the 
progressive implementation of Basel 3 and to a more intrusive 
supervision, the vulnerability of EU caused by their low profitability 
remains a source of concern for public authorities and markets (IMF, 
2017a; EBA, 2016). Almost ten years after the outbreak of the crisis, 
EU banks still present a significant negative gap between ROE and the 
cost of capital; the resulting difficulty in raising capital increases the 
risk of becoming undercapitalized when unexpected losses occur, or 
during protracted cyclical downturns. The more stringent capital 
requirements imposed after the crisis have reduced the ability of 
banks to boost ROE by increasing leverage or assuming greater risks 
non-adequately captured by regulatory risk-weights. At the same 
time, the loss of public support to solve bank crises has increased the 
risk of systemic instability due to idiosyncratic fragility (Persaud, 
2014; Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015; Micossi et al., 2016). In this 
context, the challenges to financial stability coming from weak bank 
profitability are, in many EU countries, the unintended result of the 
post-crisis regulatory reforms. 
A consistent analysis requires supervisors to look at solvency as 
the ability of a bank to generate enough future net cash flows for 
accumulating or restoring a robust cushion of safety that is capital 
(Minsky, 1975). The current supervisory approach appears powerless 
to face the problems associated to weak bank profitability. If the ability 
of banks to generate profits is low, higher capital requirements 
worsen rather than strengthen their long-term solvency.42 The 
obligation to hold a degree of capitalisation higher than what profits 
permit to generate and remunerate renders the costs of any strategy 
                                                             
41 See, for instance, the Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 13 
December 2016 on dividend distribution policies (ECB, 2016). 
42 A less net conclusion on this point is reached by Masera and Mazzoni (2016). 
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directed at solving both the NPL overhang and the consolidation of the 
long-term viability of banks’ business model unsustainable. As a 
matter of fact, low profitability incentivizes banks that are less 
capitalised and/or overloaded with NPLs to use accounting 
flexibilities to hide the true quality of their assets, thus under-
provisioning risks. In these conditions, supervisors might be induced 
to accept the overvaluation of assets, hence of capital, hoping that the 
economy will restart growing and impaired borrowers will regain 
their solvency. These attitudes appear more marked when external 
recapitalisation prompted by early loss recognition appears difficult 
for already weak banks (Hellwig, 2014; Bouvatier et al., 2014; Aiyar et 
al., 2015; Mesnard et al., 2016). With a heavy load of NPLs, the 
strategies of ‘denial and delay’ tend to prevail as the more acceptable 
solutions of the difficult puzzle arising from the trade-off between 
capitalization and solvency. 
Taking the current regulatory framework as a given, the only 
feasible sanction could probably be the threat of a more intrusive 
supervision, to proportionate to the seriousness of the viability gap. 
The so-called ‘enhanced supervision’ is explicitly contemplated by the 
EU prudential regulation for banks whose SREP indicates significant 
risks to their ongoing financial soundness (Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 
99 (3)).43 However, it is difficult to evaluate the feasibility of this 
solution, its efficacy, and the resulting costs for banks and supervisors, 
especially when efficiency and profitability gaps are systemic. 
The above suggestion for widening the discretionary supervisory 
power of intervention would fit with the regulatory revisions 
inaugurated with Basel 2 and accentuated by recent developments, 
which, strengthening the role of Pillar 2, de facto radically change the 
simple rule-based original design. Open to discussion is how welcome 
                                                             
43 The interventions of enhanced supervision are: a) increase in the number or 
frequency of on-site inspections; b) permanent presence of the competent authority 
at the institutions; c) additional or more frequent reporting by the institutions; d) 
additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic and business plan of 
the institutions; e) thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely to 
materialize.  
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should these developments be, in view of the repeated and serious 
supervisory failures. It is our opinion that, before blaming supervisors, 
we should blame the regulatory design which remains strictly focused 
on dictating capital requirements based on much questionable and 
ineffectual risk metrics, but which, more importantly, fails to ask the 
crucial question of where capital comes from. It is as if banks were 
considered always very profitable enterprises, producing enough 
internal resources to satisfy their owners’ and supervisors’ current 
requirements, able to tap the market for new capital when needed, at 
the same time adding new capital for serving a dynamic economy. 
Disregard of banks’ real profitability is also shown by the high and 
increasing compliance costs imposed on them by an increasing 
baroque regulation. We seem to have forgotten the lesson on which 
the Glass-Steagall Act was built, that of structurally ensuring bank 
profitability as the necessary basis for financial stability. Making the 
banking sector shrink, as the EU project on the Capital Markets Union 
purports, does not render the financial system safer if it makes the 
banking system less profitable.  
In some jurisdiction, like the US, banks may come near to the 
profitability condition above outlined. As we have seen, clearly this is 
not the general case for Europe, confirming that homogeneous capital 
rules do not fit structurally heterogeneous systems. There are then 
enough reasons for leading to a general and radical rethinking of the 
regulatory framework.  
Our proposal to focus regulation on banks’ viability can be 









               (1) 
where CR is the cost of risk, gk the rate of growth of capital from 
internal resources, RR the retention ratio, L the leverage, and the 
second right hand term of the equation represents ROA. 
Given that the growth of capital to accompany the growth of the 
economy sensibly should come from internal resources, unitary pre-
provision operating profits must cover unitary cost of risk, payment of 
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dividends and, given regulatory limits to leverage, the rate of growth 
of capital, which, given L, is equal to the rate of growth of total assets.  
Recognising the special nature and role of commercial banking, 
we should separate it from other banking activities, for instance 
segregating the latter inside a bank holding company as proposed 
many years ago by Minsky (1995; see also Kregel, 2014) and recently 
proposed again in the form of ring-fencing (ICB, 2011). The rationale 
of this division is that the commercial bank unit would comply with 
regulatory requirements on a solo basis. In these conditions, we could 
adopt the previous identity as the foundation of an alternative 
regulatory framework for commercial banking.44  
First of all, regulation should abandon costly and ineffective risk-
sensitive capital requirements in favour of fixing a ceiling for a simple 
prudential measure of leverage. Dismantling the costly risk-based 
Basel architecture would also boost PPOP/TA.45 Given the rough 
proportionality between the rate of growth of nominal GDP and the 
rate of growth of commercial banks’ total assets, the focus of 
regulation should be to guarantee a value of gk in line with the growth 
of the economy. This would be done, as Minsky proposed, by 
supervisors acting on the pay-out ratio. A bank that would not accept 
to fulfil its social function of serving the growth of the economy, by not 
accepting that constraint, would not justify the explicit and implicit 
public guarantees of which it benefits, including the access to central 
bank’s liquidity, and should therefore be formally excluded from them. 
Supervision should also operate a strict scrutiny on provisioning 
and impose a ceiling to the net NPL to total capital ratio. The latter 
would require adopting a clear and simple treatment of NPLs, as the 
one adopted in the US that imposes writing-off uncollectable loans 
after six months. It is our opinion that this ceiling would constitute a 
much more powerful deterrent to excessive risk taking than the 
current rules. The criticisms based on incentive distortions coming 
                                                             
44 For a more complete discussion of the principles inspiring our proposal, see 
Tonveronachi (2016). 
45 Because of the relevant fixed costs related to supervisory procedures, this would 
especially benefit smaller banks. 
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from non-sensitive risk targets, such as our PPOP/TA and leverage, 
would be strongly mitigated by these measures. 
Going back to the results of our viability test, we see that the 
regulatory framework proposed here should leave banks failing the 
test free to refuse a deep restructuring and the constraint on profit 
distribution. However, if these banks refuse regaining the ability of 
expanding their loans to the economy, they should be deprived of any 





Our proposal to address the major vulnerabilities of the Italian 
banking system concerns both the NPLs legacy, mainly due to the 
recent crisis, and the conditions necessary to ensure the long-term 
viability of the banking sector. 
The attention of commentators, analysts, and authorities has 
mainly focused on the NPL overhang. A broad agreement exists on the 
necessity for radical measures to reduce that overhang because 
counting on the sole growth of nominal GDP is deemed illusionary 
(Jobst et al., 2016; Mohaddes et al., 2017). As our analysis shows, 
Italian banks generally lack stock and flow resources to swiftly 
converge towards prudential soundness. The proposals regarding the 
Italian banking system share the belief that a timely solution of the 
legacy problem collides with the timid interventions adopted by 
national supervisors, which resist radical measures fearful of systemic 
risks. Even if the EU authorities (European Council and Council of the 
EU, 2017; European Commission, 2017) have recently concluded that 
the issue must be approached as a EU problem, fears of the 
mutualisation of losses finally leads to propose that the associated 
costs must be borne at the national level. 
The main proposals advanced to solve the NPL problem assert 
that, for cleaning up bank balance sheets, public intervention is 
necessary to help selling these deteriorated assets to the market. 
Interestingly, the ECB too seems to have recently accepted this 
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approach (Constâncio, 2017b), while in the past it has shown 
agreement with the position expressed by the Bank of Italy (Visco, 
2016), according to which “to deal effectively with NPLs, it takes years. 
It’s not something which can be urged and resolved in a very short 
period of time” (Draghi, 2016). The market solutions for cleansing 
banks’ balance-sheets focus on the creation either of a system-wide 
bad bank (Asset Management Company, AMC), or of external special 
purpose vehicles for NPL securitisation. The Italian authorities opted 
for promoting the latter,46 setting aside previous plans for a system-
wide bad bank to avoid European constrains on state aid.47 Especially 
following the proposal of EBA’s president (Enria, 2017a and 2017b; 
see also, Haben and Quagliarello, 2017),48 most contributions have, on 
the contrary, adopted the nationally based or mainly European AMC 
model (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2017). The primary function of the 
AMC should be to favour the selling of NPLs at a price nearest to their 
book value, but, at the same time, following criteria that should be 
consistent with the European rules on state aid. This would permit to 
contain banks’ losses and to limit public recapitalisation interventions. 
Unlike the prevailing stance on the matter, our opinion is that the 
solution of the NPL overhang should not focus so strictly on the timely 
disposal on the market of the impaired loans in excess of the target 
ratios. The sale on the market of NPLs is obviously an option for bank 
management, but, as the Bank of Italy rightly argues, it should result 
                                                             
46 Under the so-called “Garanzia sulla Cartolarizzazione delle Sofferenze” (GACS), the 
vehicles can buy public guarantee for the senior tranche of securities issued against 
bad loans acquired from the banks. Since the fees paid by the banks for the GACS 
should cover expected costs, the public guarantee would be state aid free. However, 
until now the incentive for banks to use the GACS scheme seems modest, as the 
transfer price including government guarantee is not such as to reduce the large 
pricing gap (Garrido et al., 2016). For a proposal in line with this approach, see Bruno 
et al. (2017). 
47 See, for instance, Bank of Italy (2017b, pp. 12-13). 
48 On Enria’s proposal, the Bank of Italy has expressed some reserves: “We remain 
convinced of its potential usefulness, provided that the asset sale prices are not 
excessively detached from their real economic value, banks’ participation in the 
scheme is voluntary, and the restructuring plans of the participating banks are 
properly defined ex ante.” (Bank of Italy, 2017a, p. 13). 
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from banks freely choosing their best course; furthermore, imposing 
blanket sales of non-performing loans “de facto [would] lead to a 
transfer of resources from Italy’s banks to a handful of specialized 
investors” (Visco 2017, p. 13-14). The supervisors’ perspective should 
obviously be to overcome banks’ vulnerability arising from the 
outrageous ratio of un-provisioned NPLs to capital which 
characterises many Italian banks. However, selling NPLs at a large 
discount deeply affects their capital base, leaving the problem 
unresolved. Using public resources to decrease that discount is, in our 
opinion, an inefficient systemic option. 
Furthermore, strictly focusing on the NPL overhang and looking 
at the problem from an aggregate perspective ignores for many banks 
the causes that, added to the recent crisis, were responsible for the Net 
NPL/TC dynamics. In other words, it ignores that several banks 
purged of their excessive NPL weight could remain in a frail position 
when confronting negative future events. The aggregate data shown 
in section 1 suggest that the Italian banking sector is a structural NPL 
outlier with respect to some major EU countries and the EU average 
because of insufficient stock and flow resources to deal with the 
idiosyncratic features of the Italian economic system.  
To see if aggregate results are just due to few bad apples or it is 
instead a truly systemic phenomenon, we have built a database with 
consolidated bank data for a largely representative sample of 
domestic institutions, banking groups, and individual banks. To 
ascertain whether the solution to the NPL legacy would leave behind 
unsolved problems, we propose an NPL stress test and complement it 
with a viability test based on perspective flows. Clearly, our exercise is 
more methodological than precisely quantitative, given that 
supervisors, having more granular information, may tailor the tests to 
the specific conditions of each bank. 
The NPL exercise, which is alternative to the traditional ones 
based on uncertain adverse scenarios, assumes that the supervisory 
authority is provided with the power to impose the write-off of the 
NPLs in excess to a target level, and to permit a partial and temporary 
reduction of capital requirements as the anticipation of future gains 
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from recoveries, adopting a largely prudential rate. The exercise 
consents to compute the impact of the cleansing of balance sheets on 
the capital ratios, adopting as adjustment factors the European 
averages of the NPL ratio and the coverage ratio. 
The result is that 78 banks fail the stress test, of which 52 are 
cooperative banks, none of which Raiffeisen banks. The institutional 
distinction is relevant because, following the recent law forcing the 
creation of cooperative groups, the ‘cohesion contract’ permits 
internal capital transfers. According to our calculations, the buffer of 
extra capital of the cooperative sector is more than enough to cover 
the recapitalisation forced by our stress test. There then remain 26 
ordinary banks whose capital shortfall would be around 10 billion 
euro. Supervisors should allow their recapitalisation only after they 
have passed a viability test, comprehensive of the resources needed to 
converge to the final Net NPL/TC target. 
The meaning of the viability test goes, anyway, beyond a mere 
completion of the NPL stress test. It serves to verify how fragile Italian 
banks would remain if the improvement of the economy, regulatory 
reforms and possible public interventions were to permit a 
progressive reduction of the weight of NPLs. We have then applied the 
viability test to all the banks of our sample, not just to those that fail 
the NPL stress test.  
We define the long-term viability of banks as their ability to 
generate unitary pre-provision operating profits (PPOP/TA) 
consistent with a target ROE, estimated as the minimum necessary for 
the different bank typologies to accompany the growth of the economy 
and maintain adequate capitalisation levels. The latter take into 
account regulatory floors and the necessity to make Net NPL/TC 
converge towards the EU average. In synthesis, the viability test 
consists in verifying if the negative PPOP/TA gap of a bank with 
respect to the target value could be offset by credible savings of 
operative costs, taking their EU average as the benchmark. 
For the entire sample of 410 banks, 274 have the PPOP/TA below 
the target and 137 fail the viability test, showing how widespread the 
cost problem is. We also show that few, if any, cost benefits might 
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come from exploiting economies of scale, because the dominant 
problem is given by inefficiencies, most probably linked to business 
and technological models leading to over-branching and 
overmanning. 
As a consequence of the viability test, we have then posed the 
question whether, for banks complying with capital requirements but 
lacking the conditions for long-term viability, the current regulation 
endows supervision with adequate powers for intervening into 
viability conditions. It is our opinion that, given the current regulatory 
framework, the powers of the so-called enhanced supervision would 
be scarcely effective and efficient in a context of systemic 
vulnerability, not least due to the associated costs. 
Summing up, contrary to what is normally suggested, simply 
solving the NPL overhang does not free the Italian banking system 
from its long-term vulnerabilities because they come from the 
inefficiencies of the current bank business models. A change in the 
regulatory and supervisory approach is needed. A first, non-
revolutionary change could come from alleviating banks from 
excessive regulatory costs and shielding them from undue 
competition. Using the ample discretion left by Pillar 2, supervision 
should focus its monitoring activity and interventions on conditions of 
long-term viability rather than on few points of current capitalisation. 
A more incisive change should start recognising the social role of 
commercial banking for the financing of the economy and would 
require disposing of the Basel framework in favour of a simpler 
scheme focused on banks’ viability, supervisory control of dividend 
payment, ex-post limit of the weight of non-performing debt, and on 
the exclusion from public safety nets of non-viable banks that refuse 
to accept the dividend constraints and deep restructurings needed to 
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Appendix 1 – Calculation of post-test capital shortfalls 
 
The following table shows the target, adjustment factors, 











NPL ratio  4.5   
Coverage ratio  44   
Excess of NPLs written-off   75  
Excess NPLs as capital bonus   25  
Average risk weight of excess 
of net NPLs 
  100  
CET1 ratio    6.5 
Tier 1 ratio    8 
Total capital ratio    10 
Net NPL/Total capital ≤ 26    
 
The formal procedure of the NPL stress test follows the steps 
reported below. 
 
New Gross NPL = Current Gross Loans * 0.045 
New Reserves = New Gross NPLs * 0.44 
New Net NPLs = New Gross NPLs – New Reserves 
Excess Reserves = Current Reserves – New Gross NPLs*0.44 
Loss = Change in Gross NPLs – Excess Reserves 
New RWA = Current RWA – New Net NPLs 
New CET1 = Current CET1 – Loss 
New Tier1 = Current Tier1 – Loss 
New TC = Current TC – Loss 
New Capital Ratios = New Capital / New RWA 
Capital Bonus = 0.25 * Gross Loss 
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New Capital ratios comprehensive of capital bonus = New Capital 
Ratios + Capital Bonus/New RWA 
Capital ratios shortfall = Capital constraints – New comprehensive 
Capital Ratios 
Capital shortfalls = Capital ratios shortfalls * New RWA 
Capital shortfall = maximum of the three capital shortfalls 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Adjustment factor for the convergence of Net 
NPL/TC 
 
The target PPOP/TA of the viability test includes a factor F specific 
to each bank that represents the annual percentage addition to capital 
necessary to converge to the 26% level of Net NPL/TC in five years. In 
formal terms: 
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑁𝑃𝐿)/𝑇𝐶 = 𝑋      (A2.1) 
Where X is the post-test value of Net NPL/TC. For a given level, K, of 
Net NPLs: 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝐾/𝑋       (A2.2) 
the 26% target implies that the new total capital is equal to: 
𝑇𝐶′ = 𝐾/0.26       (A2.3) 
From A2.2 and A2.3 we have: 
𝑇𝐶′/𝑇𝐶 = 𝑋/0.26      (A2.4) 
Hence the percentage required change of total capital is: 
∆𝑇𝐶/𝑇𝐶 = 100 ∗ (𝑋 − 0.26)/0.26    (A2.5) 
F is equal to one fifth of ΔTC/TC. 
 
